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Abstract Discretionary decisions to prosecute cases in which
a battered woman kills her partner were investigated using
several research strategies and targeting a range of case elements. Law students presented with case elements reported
they would consider legal elements over nonlegal (or
Bsupplemental^) elements when making a decision to prosecute. In contrast, law students assessed through an open-ended
format as to important case factors for deciding to prosecute
spontaneously generated high proportions of supplemental
case elements compared with legal factors. Vignette comparisons of 42 case elements on participants’ likelihood to prosecute identified salient factors including legal and supplemental variables. Themes from the open-ended responses are
discussed, as well as the extent to which supplemental factors
were more likely to be considered in prosecution decisions
when assessed through different methodological strategies.
Keywords Prosecution decisions . Stereotypes . Battered
women . Legal decision-making . Legal attitudes
Understanding how decisions are made to prosecute a battered
woman who has killed her partner but claims self-defense is of
utmost importance because of the variability in decisions for
seemingly similar cases. Although these cases are complex, it
is likely that societal ambivalence about battered women
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(BW) and difficulty matching facts of their cases with historically derived self-defense criteria may influence decisions to
prosecute a woman who has killed her partner (Gillespie
1989). Using self-report to determine whether decision
makers believe their pre-existing attitudes and beliefs influence their decisions, especially legal decisions, has long been
acknowledged as difficult to ascertain and has generally been
discarded as a viable method. The following article explores
methods for collecting data on case elements that may impact
decisions to prosecute battered women charged with the homicide of their intimate partners. The authors first discuss the
difficulties inherent in using self-defense as a justification for
killing when the defendant is a battered woman followed by
an analysis of the complexity involved in decisions to prosecute. Next, several methodologies are used to elicit responses
of decision makers to such cases through 1) reactions to listed
case factors; 2) spontaneously generated answers to an openended format following a brief case description; and 3) reactions to manipulated case factors in sets of vignettes. The
results and discussion examine how supplemental variables,
above and beyond legal criteria, appear to impact decisions to
prosecute.

Battered Women’s Homicide Cases
The judgments that culminate in a decision to prosecute in
cases where a battered woman has killed a physically abusive
partner hold obvious and frequently dire consequences for
potential defendants. Despite the gravity of these decisions
and the relatively unchecked power of the decision makers,
little is known about factors influencing these processes. The
divergent outcomes regarding prosecution (e.g., Pate 1994)
for battered women’s cases that seem markedly similar make
prosecution decisions seem mysterious and difficult to predict.
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And, beyond the enormity of the stakes for these defendants
(Radelet and Pierce 1985), the highly inconsistent outcomes
(Goetting 1987; Pate 1994; Wilbanks 1983) raise concerns
regarding potential miscarriages of justice.
Even if a battered woman is eventually acquitted after killing in self-defense (SD), just being prosecuted has serious
consequences. A study of felony defendants (Cohen and
Kyckelhahn 2010) in the 75 largest urban counties in the
United States demonstrated that the literal act of charging a
person with murder resulted in: 92 % being detained in jail
until case disposition; 47 % being denied bail; exorbitant rates
of bail; lengthy adjudication of cases; high conviction rates
(81 %); and almost perfect certainty of being sentenced to
prison if convicted or entering a plea bargain (98 %). Thus,
simply entering the judicial system can have massive consequences for these women.
Because no jurisdiction has ever allowed battered women
to introduce their battering history as an explanation, in and of
itself, to justify killing their partner, information about the
woman’s history and the sequelae of battering (often summarized as Battered Woman Syndrome but more recently presented as Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) – see
Follingstad (2003)) has been allowed for consideration within
a narrow legal context. Specifically, information as to how that
traumatic experience might impact the perceptions and decisions battered women engage in that are relevant to a variety
of legal standards (e.g., self-defense, provocation, duress, insanity, diminished capacity) has been allowed as pertinent
evidence. For self-defense cases, battering history and psychological sequelae are typically introduced as evidence to bolster
the claim that the woman reasonably believed she was in
imminent danger, that is, her perceptions and actions fit within
classic self-defense. Thus, it would be well within expectations that battered women’s homicide cases would be viewed
from the beginning through a lens of potential self-defense. In
reality, however, battered women’s homicide cases seem to
result in widely discrepant decisions to prosecute, even when
early data collection in a case suggests that SD seems a viable
explanation for the killing. What is it about these cases that
prosecution decisions are so varied? These cases are often
complex and ambiguous in nature, representative of a serious
societal violation, likely to possess emotional components,
and reasonably vulnerable to preformed and stereotypic notions of the defendants. Of necessity, the person deciding
whether to prosecute must simultaneously consider a defense
to the crime at the same time they must consider whether the
criteria for a crime were probably met (i.e., Bprobable cause^).
Ambiguity abounds with the uncertainty as to whether the
man (as the person killed) or the woman (as the recipient of
battering) is the true victim. High emotionality is frequently
exhibited on both sides, and long-standing stereotypes and
myths regarding BW are easily resurrected and applied to
these women defendants. Specifically, attitudes may be
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triggered toward the following aspects of battered women’s
cases: 1) claims of SD (Follingstad 1996; Follingstad 2003;
Follingstad et al. 1996; Follingstad et al. 1989; Follingstad
et al. 1997; Kahan and Braman 2008); 2) BW who kill
(Blackman 1990; Jenkins and Davidson 1990; Russell and
Melillo 2006; Schneider and Jordan 1978; Schuller et al.
1994); 3) BW as a group (Follingstad et al. 1988;
Follingstad et al. 2001; Follingstad et al. 1990; Gillespie
1989); 4) women’s roles (Gillespie 1989; Schneider and
Jordan 1978); and 5) crime/criminals (Kalven 1969; Narby
et al. 1993).
The obvious defense for many battered women’s homicides is justifiable SD. However, a major difficulty in using
this defense appears to be the criteria that must be met that
may not reflect the conditions under which BW who kill often
find it necessary to defend themselves (Gillespie 1989). A BW
typically kills after a long history of repeated physical abuse
that gradually shapes her expectations and beliefs about danger as well as her interpretations of interpersonal cues signaling violence. The judgment of a BW who kills, about whether
she was in grave danger at the time of the killing and whether
deadly force was necessary (both elements of SD law), may be
impossible to establish without a nuanced understanding of
her relational history and her subjective perceptions shaped
by that history. Because a legal analysis of SD relies upon
scrutiny of facts at the time of the killing, the woman’s history
is often not initially explored or considered relevant.
Investigations of battered women’s homicide cases leading
to prosecution decisions rarely demonstrate a careful inquiry
into her perceptions, reactions, and thought processes at the
time of the killing and during preceding events (Gillespie
1989).
Another difficulty in defending women as acting in SD is
the frequent mismatch of SD criteria historically developed on
models of male combatants (Gillespie 1989) with BW’s experiences. Different from dangerous male-to-male situations, violence in BW’s relationships is often characterized by ongoing
episodes without clear beginnings and endings that would
better define parameters for when a person is in danger, e.g.,
the man’s ongoing verbal threats to kill the woman greatly
expand the time frame of dangerousness (Roberts 1996). A
woman may defend herself when she perceives a lull in the
violence or when the man appears temporarily unable to harm
her, e.g., passed out from drugs or alcohol, because she knows
the violence will soon resume its dangerous level and she will
not be able to protect herself (Schuller et al. 2004).
Technically, if women act upon their knowledge of cues that
they know always signal the man will soon assault them, their
actions are likely considered pre-emptive strikes rather than
SD. And, by acting in anticipation of a deadly attack, e.g., her
awareness of escalating threats, the woman likely has no injuries or evidence of assault to prove she was facing a dangerous episode. If a BW lives in a state that legislates that people
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have a Bduty to retreat^ if at all possible from dangerous situations, but the woman has never been able to escape the
man’s assaults, or she lacks transportation, or the man has
issued a threat that he will kill her if she leaves, her historical
experience may not be taken into account in a legal analysis of
her ability to retreat. Size and strength differences may not be
considered if a woman resorts to using a weapon, which may
be viewed legally as a violation of the SD rule that a person’s
response to violence must match the level of violence directed
at him/her rather than escalating the violence to a more dangerous level. Women’s lack of knowledge as to what amount
of force is required to disable a man who has demonstrated
physical power over her may result in her using more serious
force (e.g., more shots) than technically what would be considered Breasonable^ SD between men combatants. And,
when some women have responded to the man’s violence
historically by using physical force to protect themselves, this
may be interpreted by the decision maker as both members of
the couple being physically abusive, therefore she is not a
Bvictim,^ and therefore she cannot justify her killing of him
as protection from harm (Ewing and Aubrey 1987; Russell
and Melillo 2006).
The difficulty mapping SD criteria onto cases involving
BW, combined with society’s ambivalent attitudes toward
BW, and the fact that the woman is usually the only witness
to the events, have all likely contributed to inconsistent outcomes. Quasi-experimental studies manipulating SD elements, characteristics of the woman, or aspects of the case
have begun to demonstrate that mock jurors can even be influenced by factors that are not pertinent to decisions of guilt/
innocence and that some of the unique perspectives of battered
women are not understood by average jurors as having salient
implications for SD (Braden-Maguire et al. 2005; Cheyne and
Dennison 2005; Finkel et al. 1991; Follingstad et al. 1989;
1997; Terrance et al. 2000). Therefore, if those persons making prosecutorial decisions do not have such specialized
knowledge regarding BW’s experiences, these homicide cases
appear especially vulnerable to being prosecuted. For example, some societal stereotypes which may negate an explanation of SD as a BW’s response to an assault include: BW are
masochistic and wish to be beaten (Kuhl 1984); BW create the
problems for which they are physically abused, therefore deserving the abuse (Snell et al. 1964); women are irrational,
emotional, and not logical (Gillespie 1989). (See Table 1 for
stereotypes regarding battered women and their homicide
cases upon which many of the case elements for this study
were devised.)
Different from many homicides, a wider range of evidentiary components are often available in BW’s homicide cases
for interpretation in the decision to prosecute. Battered
Women typically are the ones to call for help following the
violent incident (Browne and Williams 1989), and therefore
who killed the man is typically not an issue. Because of this,
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law enforcement can immediately observe the woman’s initial
reactions, note whether any injuries are present, witness an
unmodified homicide scene, and question the woman – all
data for addressing legal issues of SD and guilt/innocence
specific to the killing incident. These cases also provide
supplemental material potentially pertinent to the case in the
form of historical information about the battering relationship
if it is collected during the investigation. While this supplemental data may help support a claim of SD, it can also be
dissected by decision makers who believe that, from specific
pieces of data, they can ascertain the credibility of the
woman’s SD claim by determining whether the battering relationship was dangerous enough to justify her need to defend
herself. There are no specific guidelines to know exactly what
battering experiences would convince the person who is deciding whether or not to prosecute, but typically objective
documentation (e.g., medical records, protective orders) or
data establishing the physical battery as severe (e.g., man
threatened woman with a gun in the past; threats to kill; serious injuries) seem to be required. And last, these cases like all
criminal cases, possess extraneous elements that should not
influence decisions to prosecute (e.g., characteristics of the
woman and/or the man; external pressures to prosecute or
not, demographic data, and presence of children), although a
case can be made that BW as potential defendants are even
more subject to stereotypes, biases, and other irrelevant factors. (See Table 2 for a detailed listing of specific elements for
legal and supplemental categories of case elements.)

Decisions to Prosecute
Discrepancies among prosecutorial decisions for the full range
of criminal charges, not just BW cases, led O’Neill (2004) to
conclude that B…[u]nderstanding why prosecutors select certain cases for prosecution and disregard others is one of the
greatest enigmas of the criminal justice system^ (p. 1439).
Although a decision to prosecute supposedly rests upon a
straightforward, rational appraisal of case evidence to determine the probable likelihood a suspect committed an act that
meets the formal, legal definition of a crime, this description
may greatly underestimate the process and types of information that end up influencing the final decision. Even with
simpler criminal cases, deciding to prosecute requires initial
identification of evidence followed by selective weighting and
interpretation of the evidence. Along with determining an explanatory sequence or Bstory^ that assigns an estimate of probability that a crime was committed (Pennington and Hastie
1992), the decision maker must match evidence to a specific
type and level of crime (e.g., murder vs. manslaughter vs.
reckless homicide) that often requires a nuanced assessment
of situational and psychological variables involving inferences and attributions about intent, motive, and state of mind.
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Table 1
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Stereotypes potentially affecting decisions to prosecute which provided the basis for case elements in the study

1. Women create the problems for which they are abused.P
2. Woman should leave the relationship so that abuse does not escalate over time.RET
3. Women are masochistic and want to be hurt.S; REA
4. Women overreact (i.e., therefore the situation was misinterpreted as dangerous).S
5. Women aren’t rational or logical – why would she believe he would kill her this time?REA
6. The woman cannot start an argument and then expect nothing to happen.P
7. Women should not resort to a weapon if the man is only using his hands and feet to attack her.E
8. A verbal threat is not sufficient to justify killing, i.e., it is too vague as to when or whether it would happen.E; S
9. The man’s Bcues^ interpreted by the woman do not seem dangerous enough.S; I; REA
10. There is no reason the woman could not have escaped out of the situation.RET
11. She should have left the relationship a long time ago so this would not have happened.RET
12. There are no medical or police records, so she must be making it up.S; REA
13. The woman’s interpretations of the man’s behavior and dangerousness are illogical.REA
14. The woman’s claim that she was still in a dangerous period from which she could not escape is not believable if the physical beating seemed to
have stopped.I
15. Just because she couldn’t escape before does not mean she could not have escaped this time.RET
16. The woman’s view of her partner as omnipotent is not believable.REA
17. If the woman ever used physical force in return, either she can hold her own and did not need to kill him, or she is as much to blame as he is for the
physical abuse.S; P; REA
18. If the woman is not small of stature, then consideration of physical size/strength differences is negated.S; REA
19. The woman’s claim that she continued to be fearful of the man after one shot or stab which led to more shots or stabs is unreasonable – another motive
must be at work.D; E; REA
20. The woman’s abuse experience does not seem to be severe enough to suggest fear of bodily harm or death, e.g., no prior
life-threatening injuries.S; REA
21. The woman was responsible for getting some type of external help to prevent all of this.RET; REA
22. The woman is likely a deficient character – either a weak character or undesirable one.REA
23. The woman should appear extremely upset and hysterical after a homicide; otherwise she seems to be a cold-blooded murderer. [Conversely, if she
appears hysterical, she is an unreasonable, out-of-control person.]REA
24. Any actions after the killing except calling police/ambulance are suspect.REA
25. Battered women have many other motives for killing the partner as a result of how they were treated, e.g., revenge, insurance, tired of the abuse,
quicker way to get rid of the man than divorce.REA
26. If an argument proceeded this, the woman is responsible for provoking the physical incident that ended in her killing him.P
27. A beating is not all that serious.S
28. If they were not face-to-face when she shot/stabbed him, danger was not imminent.I
29. If the woman acted impulsively, then she is not acting reasonably.REA
30. Because of the effects on her from the abuse, the woman cannot make a reasoned decision.REA
31. If she is the only witness to the killing, the woman is suspect.REA
32. The woman’s reported fear is not a good enough reason to kill someone.REA
33. A man would not have interpreted the situation as the woman did.REA
Superscripts refer to the self-defense element that would be impacted if a person believes the statement. The elements are: S seriousness of the physical
danger, I imminence of the danger, RET ability to retreat from the situation, P freedom from provocation, E equal force rule (i.e., cannot escalate), D use
only force necessary to disable attacker, and REA reasonableness of the person’s perceptions and judgments in the situation

It is only in recent years that researchers have attempted to
apply research models with prosecuting attorneys (PAs) to
determine whether factors other than legal concepts influence
their legal decisions. A small body of literature on the discretionary powers of PAs has accumulated since Shaver et al.
(1975) expressed their concern at the lack of scientific scrutiny
directed at PAs’ decision-making. Unfortunately, these studies
have chosen limited and concrete factors as predictors of prosecution rather than utilizing variables that would demonstrate

the influence of less-conscious decision-making or preexisting stereotypes (Albonetti and Hepburn 1996). Thus, research studies have investigated the impact of gender, bail
outcome, presence of witnesses, arrest at the scene, victimoffender relationship, a prior record, potential sentence length,
an identifiable victim (Albonetti 1986), attorney type (Parrotta
2006), and district size, resource scarcity, and prioritization of
cases (O’Neill 2004) on prosecution decisions. One study
(Myers and Hagan 1979) concluded that decisions to
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Table 2 Coding categories of legal and supplemental variables with
frequency of occurrence
Legal variables (243 responses)
Self defense elements (163 responses)
Serious harm was imminent* (84 responses)
Reasonableness of belief of danger* (32 responses)
Only enough force to disable* (14 responses)
Retreat if possible* (10 responses)
Not the one to provoke conflict* (6 responses)
Reciprocal amount of force to what received (2 responses)
Believability of guilt or innocence* (80 responses)
Cause of death
Possible motives
Her subsequent actions at the scene
Her subsequent reactions to man’s death
Her claims of why killing occurred (from statement/talking with
police)
Her interpretation of partner’s actions at the time
Supplemental variables (396 responses)
Credibility of battering issues (211 responses)
Evidence/documentation of physical abuse historically*
(45 responses)
Prior domestic violence calls to police* (20 responses)
Level of seriousness of past abuse* (frequency, duration, severity,
injuries) (77 responses)
Evidence of prior protective disorders (3 responses)
Evidence that she engaged in actions to diminish abuse or leave the
relationship* (28 responses)
Evidence of controlling/dominance in addition to physical abuse*
(15 responses)
Predictability of his violence (0 responses)
Recency of battering and major episodes (4 responses)
General quality of relationship reported by others* (7 responses)
External threats by the man toward her family members/children/
friends (8 responses)
Extraneous supplemental factors (185 responses)
Characteristics of the woman* (129 responses)
Mental health issues* (44 responses)
Substance/alcohol use (10 responses)
Reputation* (33 responses)
Whether the woman was ever violent either generally or toward her
partner* (34 responses)
Whether she protected the children from abuse (8 responses)
Physically disabled
Characteristics of the man (28 responses)
Mental health issues* (5 responses)
Substance/alcohol use (3 responses)
General violence by the man* (15 responses)
Positive reputation of man (4 responses)
Negative reputation of the man (not re: violence, e.g., affair)
(1 response)
Demographics (11 responses)
SES (4 responses)
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Table 2 (continued)
Ethnicity (0 responses)
Marital status (0 responses)
Employment status* (4 responses)
Age (2 responses)
Number of children (1 response)
External sources of pressure (11 responses)
Community pressure (6 responses)
Media coverage (0 responses)
Man’s family’s opinion/preference regarding prosecution*
(2 responses)
Advocacy group involvement* (0 responses)
Lack of resources for woman in the past (1 response)
Legal considerations of the community, e.g., cost, caseload
(2 responses)
Impact on children (6 responses)
Children witnessed abuse to mother in past (2 responses)
Children would be placed in foster care/parentless if prosecuted
(2 responses)
Children also abused in past (2 responses)
*=Legal and Supplemental variables used on SCE scale

prosecute were based on the likelihood of being able to obtain
a guilty verdict plus the perceived dangerousness of the defendant. However, Fairfax (2008) stated, what is often thought
but not confirmed, that B…prosecutors just as often decide
whether to charge based on factors other than the sufficiency
of the evidence^ (p. 734). This relatively private decision with
its hidden process needs more empirical scrutiny to insure its
accountability and to examine the types of nonevidentiary
influences that may be part of that decision-making process.
Current research on information processing and social
judgment suggests that individuals’ perceptions of events
can be selective, and that their interpretation of events (the
organization of Bfacts^ into meaningful patterns) may be
heavily influenced by pre-existing decision rules, beliefs, attitudes, and emotional states. These pre-existing cognitive
structures (labeled mental models, cognitive schemas, and
heuristics; Myers 2002), constitute the lens through which
people evaluate information, generate meanings, infer cause
and effect, form judgments, and reach decisions, sometimes
accomplished unconsciously (Gigerenzer et al. 1999;
Goldstein and Gigerenzer 2002). Because they impose preexisting mental structures upon current situations, they also
have the potential to contribute to various forms of bias, distortion and inaccuracy (Myers 2002). [Note: Basing judgments on pre-existing beliefs and schemas does not imply
valence and can be experienced along a continuum of positive
to negative skew.]
Although social scientists understand and expect that factors other than strictly legal ones could significantly affect
decision-making in this realm, perhaps because lawyers are
trained with an emphasis on rationality and legal specificity,
attorneys may believe their decisions are much less influenced
by any pre-existing schemas. However, persons can, at any
time, be aware or unaware of the origin or content of a
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particular attitude or aware of the attitude and its source but
not aware of its impact (Gawronski et al. 2006; Greenwald
and Banaji 1995). Stereotypes constitute a subset of attitudes
that have an influence on information processing when activated (Brewer 1996). There is also evidence that preformed
schemas and mental models become increasingly influential
for individuals’ judgments in complex, uncertain, and ambiguous situations (Piperides et al. 2006). That description is
easily applied to legal cases where conflicting evidence, gaps
in evidence, irrelevant information, and criteria for decisions
do not always match carefully constructed criteria for crimes
and defenses.
If persons responsible for deciding whether to prosecute a
case generally understand that their main task consists of establishing the probability that a crime was committed through
matching case facts to specified elements of a crime or its
defense, then they likely expect an objective, fair, and rational
decision would be based on legal considerations. Any nonobjective, irrelevant, personalized, or biased factors influencing the decision matrix would be considered a violation of
justice. Thus, it is expected that individuals presented with
case elements to consider when deciding to prosecute will
report they are much more likely to consider legal elements
as opposed to case elements having an indirect or little relationship to legal criteria (henceforth called supplemental factors). However, without providing such structure that allows
individuals to more clearly present their Bideal^ and intended
approach to cases, but rather requiring decision makers to
spontaneously devise their own criteria was expected to show
that they generate supplemental factors (i.e., idiosyncratic,
personalized, and stereotypic elements) as part of their considerations along with socially desirable responses (i.e., legal
criteria). Collecting respondents’ spontaneous remarks using
an unstructured approach has a long history in the form of
projective assessment in that BThey provide a more direct
readout of motivational and emotional experiences than do
self-reports that are filtered through analytic thought and various concepts of self and others^ (pp. 698–699) (McClelland
et al. 1989). This methodology has been used in nonlegal
settings (e.g., Allen et al. 1988) and is beginning to be recognized as a productive technique when researching legal concepts if more spontaneous and unfiltered responses are desired
(e.g., Smith 1991).

Purpose of this Study and Hypotheses
This exploratory study seeks to determine whether supplemental and extraneous factors are likely to be part of the
decision-making process in addition to legal criteria in decisions to prosecute cases in which battered women killed their
partners. This study also assesses whether reliance on supplemental and extraneous factors is more likely to occur when
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decisions to prosecute are measured through indirect methods,
i.e., research strategies involving open-ended responses or vignette comparisons, than direct measurement of case factors.
The following hypotheses were advanced and approached
through different methodologies:
1. Presented with a face valid listing of legal and supplemental case elements potentially influencing decisions in a
BW’s homicide case, participants will report they are
much more likely to consider legal elements when making decisions to prosecute as opposed to supplemental
elements.
2. In response to instructions to spontaneously generate case
elements of BW’s homicide cases they would consider
important for deciding to prosecute, participants will respond to this open-ended, unstructured format by producing supplemental factors (i.e., stereotypical and extraneous elements) in addition to legal factors.
3. Targeted case elements presented in vignettes, including
stereotypical variables and unique problems inherent in
BW’s use of SD in homicide cases, will result in participants reporting a higher likelihood of prosecution when
the vignette describes these elements when compared
with contrasting vignettes, thus highlighting particular legal and supplemental variables that appear more salient
for decisions to prosecute.

Method
Participants
Law students nearing the end of their course in Criminal Law
were recruited as participants in this exploratory study to ensure similar knowledge regarding criminal law theory and
statutes. Law students in different experiments did not differ
as to their affinity toward a career as a prosecutor or whether
they or someone close to them had been a victim of physical
battering, prosecuted for a major or minor crime, or had a
career in law enforcement, F(10,14)=0.30, p=n.s. In addition,
across experiments, there were no demographic differences
among the participants F(10,92)=0.83, p=n.s., and an additional analysis by gender did not indicate differential responses to the various experimental conditions, F(3,32)=
0.83, p=n.s.
Participants were 64 first year law students at a large public
university in the Southeast. The participants ranged in age
from 22 to 35 years old and the median age was 23 years
old. Participants included 37 males (57.8 %) and18 females
(28.1 %). Nine participants (14.1 %) did not answer this item.
Of the 64 participants, 55 were Caucasian (85.9 %), five were
African American (7.8 %), two identified as Biracial (3.1 %),
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and one was Native American (1.6 %). One person chose not
to disclose race (1.6 %). Fifty-nine of the participants had
never been married (92.2 %), four were married (6.3 %), and
one was divorced/separated (1.6 %). Thirty-one of the participants were from a small town (48.4 %), 22 were from a
suburban area (34.4%), six were from a rural area (9.4 %),
and five were from an urban area (7.8 %). Forty-three participants grew up in the Southeast (67.2 %), 16 grew up in the
Midwest (25.0 %), two grew up in the Northeast (3.1 %), one
grew up in the Southwest (1.6 %), and two responded Bnot
applicable^ due to frequent moves (3.1 %). Thirty-three participants’ family-of-origin income was over $100,000 per year
(51.6 %), 16 had family incomes of $61000–$100,000
(25.0 %), 11 had family incomes of $31,000–$60,000
(17.2 %), three had family incomes of $30,000 or under
(4.7 %), and one chose not to respond.
Measures
Measurement of Legal and Supplemental Factors No
measures exist that examine individuals’ reliance on specific
case factors for making legal decisions. Therefore, based on
prior research models, new instrumentation was developed for
this study. Methodology I explicitly delineated legal and supplemental variables for BW’s homicide cases to which participants reported the degree to they would take those factors into
consideration when making decisions to prosecute.
Methodology II required participants to spontaneously generate case elements they considered significant for decisions to
prosecute. This method utilized an open-ended response technique (e.g., Allen et al. 1988) with the responses subsequently
categorized by raters as to their legal or supplemental classification. Methodology III assessed the impact of hypothesized
case factors on the likelihood to prosecute through comparisons of vignettes about BW’s cases. Versions counter to each
other of these case elements were presented to different participants – one version was hypothesized to decrease the likelihood of prosecution (e.g., the woman shot her husband only
once when defending herself) while the other version was
hypothesized to increase the likelihood of prosecution (e.g.,
the woman shot her husband four times).
Categorization of Legal Versus Supplemental Elements
Across measurement strategies, a priori conceptualization of
the type of case factors likely to have legal relevance or influence decisions to prosecute BW’s cases guided their inclusion
and coding (See Table 2). Both legal standards and literature
on battered women’s legal cases (e.g., Gillespie 1989) were
used to generate potential categories to be evaluated across the
various measures. The broadest categorical division for factors
potentially influencing decisions to prosecute is the use of
legal elements (i.e., those rules of law regarding the alleged
crime specified by statute or case law plus legal procedures
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expected to guide legal decision-making in particular cases)
versus supplemental elements (i.e., those elements of cases
that may indirectly inform decision-making that are not specific to the actual incident plus the range of irrelevant, potentially biasing, or stereotypical case factors). Legal and
Supplemental elements are found in all three methodologies,
but they are utilized differently for each exploratory study.
Applied to BW’s homicide cases, the broad categories of
Legal and Supplemental elements are each subdivided further
into relevant subcategories. For the Legal component, SD is
often the paramount consideration for deciding not to prosecute. Cases with specific descriptions meeting the six standard
concepts of SD (i.e., perception of serious danger, perception
of danger as imminent, reasonableness of the person’s perceptions and actions, the person acting in SD did not initiate the
physical incident, the use of defensive force was similar to that
directed toward them and not more than that needed to stop
the attack, and the person could not safely retreat) are case
elements that would generally need to be met to fulfill criteria
to establish SD. (See Table 1 for the stereotypes regarding BW
and their cases that would appear to conflict with SD elements.) Thus, elements of SD are the first major Legal subcategory and separated from the second subcategory
representing legal elements suggestive of Guilt/Innocence
(e.g., motive; handling evidence; reporting promptly; the
woman’s emotional state following the incident).
For Supplemental elements, the first major subdivision consists of relevant case factors that they may indirectly raise or
reduce credibility of major legal issues. Because SD elements
apply strictly to the actual incident of the killing/injury, this
subcategory (Credibility of Battering) encompasses characteristics of the woman’s physical abuse history that decisionmakers might view as supporting or contradicting the woman’s
claims that her partner was dangerous at the time of the incident, whether the characteristics are pertinent, based on myths,
or potentially misleading. Examples include: documentation of
past injuries; prior calls to police; severity of the abuse; whether
the woman followed through in obtaining protective orders or
prosecuting her partner; whether the woman ever used physical
force herself when attacked by the man; whether the man ever
verbally threatened to kill her. Constituting the other major
subcategory within Supplemental elements, is the Extraneous
subscale representing elements which are more clearly irrelevant and often stereotypical that likely could still impinge upon
decision-making, for example, victim and defendant characteristics, demographic variables, external sources of pressure, and
the role of children. (See Table 2 for specific examples of Legal
and Supplemental subcategories.)
Methodologies
Methodology I. Specific Case Elements Scale (SCE) This
scale delineated 38 specific factors that would be potentially
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important for consideration when deciding whether to prosecute a BW’s homicide case. Twelve items consisted of Selfdefense and Guilt/Innocence Legal elements, both scored as
subscales as well as summed (SCELegal), and the other 26
variables consisted of Credibility of Battering and Extraneous
Supplemental variables, both scored as subscales as well as
summed (SCESupplemental) (See Table 2 for specific elements included on this scale). Participants responded to each
case element using a 6-point Likert scale (1=I absolutely
would NOT consider this; 2=I most likely would NOT consider this; 3=I probably would NOT consider this; 4=I probably WOULD consider this; 5=I most likely WOULD consider
this; and 6=I absolutely WOULD consider this). Mean scores
were calculated for all four subcategories and the two major
categories.
Methodology II. Open-Ended Response Measure for Decisions to Prosecute (OE) This methodology used spontaneously generated responses of participants in reaction to a briefly described scenario as the data for analysis. Participants were
instructed to imagine themselves as the prosecutor in a case in
which a woman killed her husband and initial information
collected in the case revealed that she claimed to be a battered
woman. Participants were asked to spontaneously generate
characteristics of these cases that they believed would influence them to decide whether the case should be prosecuted or
not. One-half of participants were instructed to write ten characteristics that they believed would influence them to
prosecute the case, after which they were instructed to repeat
the task indicating factors that would suggest the case did not
warrant prosecution. To control for order effects, the other half
of the participants completing this measure performed the task
in reverse order.
Two psychology graduate students were trained to code
participants’ responses based on descriptions of SD,
Guilt/Innocence, Credibility of Battering, or Extraneous
categories. The raters were highly similar in their coding
for almost every categorization at the broadest level of
Legal vs. Supplemental and for the major subdivisions
within those categories (kappa=0.91). If raters disagreed
as to the more specific subcategorizations, discussion with
the primary researcher occurred until consensus was
reached. Two types of participant responses that could
not be resolved in this way resulted in the establishment
of new subcategories.
Proportions of each of the four subcategories in relation to
the total number of responses given by a participant were the
scores used for analysis. For example, out of 20 possible openended responses, a participant could have indicated two legal
SD responses (2/20 = 0.10), six legal guilt/innocence responses (6/20=0.30), eight supplemental responses as to credibility of battering (8/20=0.40), and four extraneous responses
(4/20=0.20).
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Methodology III. Experimentally Manipulated Factors
Influencing Decisions to Prosecute (VIG) Forty-two factors
that spanned the four subcategories of case elements were
hypothesized to potentially influence the likelihood of prosecution based on literature from battered women’s homicide
cases, literature on battered women, and clinical/forensic experience (See Table 1). To test each factor, a pair of vignettes
was devised in which one stated the factor being assessed
while the other was the Bcontrol condition^ for that factor.
Thus, each pair of vignettes contained identical wording that
varied only in the depiction of the Bopposite^ portrayal of the
hypothesized factor (e.g., whether the man was shot in the
front or the back). [Table 3 lists each manipulated factor and
mean scores for each version.] Participants received only one
version of a set, such that the group rating the likelihood of
prosecution of one version could be compared with the group
of participants who received the alternative version. Vignettes
were distributed so that participants read some that might influence decisions to prosecute and some that would suggest
the case might not warrant prosecution. They were also distributed so that participants read vignettes covering both Legal
and Supplemental variables. After reading each vignette, participants rated the degree to which they thought the case
should be prosecuted on a 6-point Likert scale (1=Definitely
NOT prosecute; 2=Probably NOT prosecute; 3=Slightly think
NOT prosecute; 4=Slightly think SHOULD prosecute;
5=Probably SHOULD prosecute; and 6=Definitely
SHOULD prosecute). Mean scores were calculated for each
version of the 42 vignettes.
Demographics Law students reported their age, gender, ethnicity, marital status, locale in which they were raised (i.e.,
urban, suburban, small town, rural), part of the country reared
in, and family-of-origin income. As a gross determination of
potential biases, participants were asked as to their potential
interest in becoming a prosecutor and whether they had any
exposure (i.e., with family, close friends, or self) to intimate
partner physical violence, to being prosecuted for a crime, or
having a career in law enforcement.

Results
Methodology I. Comparison of Ratings of Specific Case
Elements Impacting Likelihood to Prosecute
For the law student sample (N=22) that completed the SCE, a
paired samples t-test was employed to compare their mean
scores for intention to utilize legal elements of BW’s homicide
cases (SCELegal) when deciding to prosecute with their mean
scores for intention to utilize supplemental elements
(SCESupplemental). As predicted, law students significantly
rated legal elements (M = 4.86) higher in terms of their
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Univariate results of between group ratings on legal and supplemental variables manipulated in vignettes

Legal and supplemental variables

Univariate F

Group 1
mean

Group 2
mean

Group 3
mean

Man shot in the fronta vs. backb

F(1,42)=0.007 ns

4.35a

4.32b

–

Woman is a successful business womana vs. homemakerb

F(1,42)=2.177 ns

4.10a

–

3.50b

Woman drinking during incidenta vs. not drinkingb

F(1,42)=27.324****

–

4.91a

3.32b

Woman reports her statement to police as accuratea vs. inaccurateb

F(1,42)=15.873****

5.00a

3.64b

–

No history of medical injuriesa vs. history of injuries from abuseb

F(1,42)=58.443****

4.90a

–

2.50b

Woman shoots immediately after severe threata vs. man falls asleep after
severe threat and woman shoots while man sleepingb
Crime scene as described by womana vs. woman changed crime sceneb

F(1,42)=50.609****

–

2.57a

4.86b

F(1,42)=6.767**

3.40a

4.27b

–

Man’s behavior unique when she shot hima vs. predictive as signaling abuseb

F(1,42)=2.391 ns

4.35a

–

3.77b

Ex–wife reports no physical abusea vs. she reports similar batteringb

F(1,42)=10.012**

–

4.38a

3.14b
–

Woman did not think to run outa vs. did not run due to small childrenb

F(1,42)=16.798****

3.95a

2.50b

No injuries on womana vs. injuries found on her at the timeb

F(1,42)=35.399****

4.90a

–

2.59b

Boyfriend as victima vs. husband as victimb

F(1,42)=3.864*

–

3.62a

4.32b
–

Neighbors report hearing nothinga vs. hearing an argument before shootingb

F(1,42)=0.245 ns

4.60a

4.46b

Man has a mental conditiona vs. man has no mental conditionb

F(1,42)=4.991*

4.00a

–

4.59b

Man’s family wants prosecution of womana vs. does not want her chargedb

F(1,42)=6.816*

–

3.67a

2.73b
–

Woman fired four shotsa vs. one shotb

F(1,42)=9.235**

4.95a

4.00b

Woman is overweighta vs. smallb

F(1,42)=8.029**

4.30a

–

3.00b

Woman has a good reputationa vs. not liked in communityb

F(1,42)=18.334****

–

3.34a

4.59b
–

History of calls by her to policea vs. no history of calls to policeb

F(1,42)=31.362****

2.65a

4.55b

Woman feared man still alive after shootinga vs. knowing he was deadb

F(1,42)=5.649*

3.95a

–

3.00b

Inaccurately thought bulge was guna vs. accurately thought bulge was gunb

F(1,42)=32.464****

–

4.76a

2.73b
–

Woman does not have a mental disordera vs. woman has mental disorderb

F(1,42)=3.183 ns

4.60a

3.86b

Uncertain why she shot four timesa vs. claimed fear influenced more shotsb

F(1,42)=0.286 ns

4.30a

–

4.09b

Advocacy group became involved in casea vs. no advocacy involvementb

F(1,42)=8.854**

–

3.38a

4.36b
–

Neighbor reported abuse lasting for 10 yearsa vs. 10 monthsb

F(1,42)=0.076 ns

2.55a

2.46b

Never able to escape by runninga vs. prior success but not able to this timeb

F(1,42)=0.208 ns

3.95a

–

4.09b

Man used hands and feet to abusea vs. history of putting gun to her headb

F(1,42)=1.336 ns

–

3.14a

2.72b

Woman not diagnosed with PTSDa vs. woman diagnosed with PTSDb

F(1,42)=35.845****

4.45a

2.55b

–

Man’s signal for abuse seems vague and not threateninga vs. threateninga

F(1,42)=15.457****

4.50a

–

3.00b

Calls to police on man onlya vs. calls on woman as well as manb

F(1,42)=58.058****

–

2.71a

4.77b
–

Reputation of man as generally violenta vs. no reputation of violenceb

F(1,42)=6.587*

3.30a

4.18b

Last major abuse incident occurred within last 2 weeksa vs. 3 years agob

F(1,42)=11.665***

3.20a

–

4.41b

No statements by woman of fearing mana vs. spontaneous statement of fearb

F(1,42)=2.795 ns

–

4.52a

4.00b
–

Woman rumored to be having affaira vs. woman thought to be faithfulb

F(1,42)=15.776****

4.95a

3.77b

Woman with African American namea vs. Caucasian nameb

F(1,42)=0.939 ns

4.40a

–

4.09b

Woman was vague but claimed self–defensea vs. claimed as accidentb

F(1,42)=7.384**

–

3.57a

4.55b
–

Historically, physical abuse plus verbal threats to killa vs. physical abuse onlyb

F(1,42)=0.508 ns

3.35a

3.59b

Following incident, woman was hystericala vs. woman was calm and quietb

F(1,42)=31.641****

2.95a

–

4.82b

Woman with inconsistent blue collar work historya vs. successful business ownerb

F(1,42)=0.433 ns

–

4.05a

4.23b
–

Delay in calling 911 after shootinga vs. immediately calling 911b

F(1,42)=26.485****

4.80a

3.14b

Man’s family claimed she threatened to kill him oncea vs. no threats knownb

F(1,42)=0.812 ns

5.00a

–

4.73b

Woman was able to clearly delineate what caused feara vs. unable to clearly
delineate cause of fearb

F(1,42)=21.047****

–

3.43a

4.82b

Group 1 and 2 MANOVA: F (14,27)=6.407, p=.0001. Group 1 and 3 MANOVA: F (14, 27)=11.459, p=.0001. Group 2 and 3 MANOVA: F(14,28)=
28, p=.0001
Subscripts a and b indicate which group mean corresponds with each version of the manipulated variable
Significance is indicated as follows: ****p≥.0001; ***p≥.001; **p≥.01; *p≥.05; ns not significant
Mean ratings based on the following response categories: 1 = Definitely NOT prosecute, 2 = Probably NOT prosecute, 3 = Slightly think NOT prosecute,
4 = Slightly think SHOULD prosecute, 5 = Probably SHOULD prosecute, 6 = Definitely SHOULD prosecute
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likelihood of considering those factors while making prosecution decisions than the supplemental elements (M=4.08),
t(20)=8.36, p>0.0001. Thus, participants rated their likelihood of utilizing SCELegal elements in their decisionmaking as BI most likely would consider this^ as contrasted
with the likelihood of BI probably would consider this^ that
they used for rating the SCESupplemental elements.
As expected, those completing the SCE rated their likelihood of considering legal self-defense elements (M=5.79
out of 6.00) significantly higher than legal elements relating to general guilt/innocence elements (M =4.95), t(20)=
6.02, p>0.0001. These scores indicated that the law students almost unanimously predicted that they would
Babsolutely^ consider SD elements, while they still indicated a strong likelihood (i.e., Bmost likely^) to consider
Guilt/Innocence elements.
Law students’ ratings on the SCE of their likely consideration of Credibility of Battering case elements (M=
4.86) compared with Extraneous supplemental elements
(e.g., characteristics of the woman/man; demographics)
(M=3.44) produced ratings in the expected direction. A
paired samples t-test indicated a greater likelihood that
participants would consider Credibility of Battering elements than they would consider Extraneous elements,
t(20)= 12.83, p > 0.0001. Pertaining to battering history,
the highest ratings were for variables related to the types
of Bproof Barising from the battering history that law students believe would bolster the woman’s claim of the
man’s dangerousness: a) whether the woman required
medical care due to battering in the past (M=5.19); b)
whether the woman had reported the man’s physical abuse
to the police (M=5.14); c) whether severe domination and
control by the man accompanied the physical abuse (M=
5.14); d) whether the woman had a history of mental
illness (M = 4.81); e) whether the physical abuse had
consisted of serious violence rather than milder forms
(M=5.19); f) whether the woman has been diagnosed with
post-traumatic stress disorder from the abuse (M=4.76);
and g) whether the man had specifically threatened to kill
her if she left him (M=4.95). Interestingly, participants
were also very likely to consider Bwhether the man had
called the police complaining of physical force by the
woman (M=5.62), although it is expected that this would
work to negate her claim of self-defense.
In contrast, the significant Extraneous elements were
rated by participants in the lower half of the response range
which indicated participants were not likely to consider
those case elements. These included: a) the community’s
reaction to the case (M = 3.24); b) the reputation of the
defense attorney (M = 2.57); c) whether local advocacy
groups were involved in the woman’s case (M=2.05); d)
the preferences of the man’s family as to whether the woman s h ou l d b e p r o s ec ut ed ( M = 2. 90 ) ; e ) p ers on al
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characteristics of the woman (M=2.67); and f) whether or
not the woman knew how to use guns (M=2.76).
Methodology II: Comparison of Open-ended Responses
of Case Elements Impacting Likelihood to Prosecute
The spontaneously generated responses of 41 law students to
the OE measure were coded as representing the four subcategories of responses and standardized by calculating proportions of those responses, in comparison to the total number
generated by each person. Analyses were conducted to determine whether first orienting participants to generate elements
that would influence them to prosecute and second to generate
elements inclined to influence them not to prosecute would
produce different responses than the reverse order. A between
groups t-test did not result in significantly different proportions of Legal versus Supplemental elements generated, F(1,
41)=0.71, p=n.s.
The coding of the responses in the OE condition did not
include any valence or Bdirection^ of the responses, but only
resulted in a coding of the subcategory to which each response
belonged. Therefore, a second analysis compared the proportion of Legal responses for the condition in which participants
were instructed to state case elements that would lead them Bto
prosecute^ vs. the condition that would lead them Bnot to
prosecute.^ Using paired sample t-tests for this comparison
resulted in no significant differences, t(42)=−0.64, p=n.s.
Because neither of the two potentially confounding conditions was related to the production of responses, data from
both OE conditions were collapsed. Using a paired samples
t-test to compare the proportion of Legal and Supplemental
spontaneously generated responses resulted in a highly significant difference, t(42)=−4.21, p>0.0001. Participants produced almost two times as many Supplemental responses
(proportion mean = 0.61; total number of responses = 396)
as Legal responses (proportion mean = 0.39; total number of
responses = 243).
The proportions of generated responses in the subcategories for Supplemental elements (i.e., Credibility of
Battering History and Extraneous) were negatively correlated,
r(42)=−0.37, p>0.0001, such that the more participants produced responses considering credibility of the battering, the
less likely they were to generate extraneous elements, although the proportions of these two subcategories were not
significantly different, t(42)=1.16, p=n.s. It is important to
note that, overall, 28 % of the open-ended responses pertained
to the Extraneous subcategory consisting of irrelevant and
potentially biasing elements.
When participants generated case elements relevant to
Credibility of Battering, the following issues were raised most
often: the level of seriousness of past abuse; historical evidence or documentation of the physical abuse; evidence that
the woman engaged in actions to diminish the abuse or leave
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the relationship; and evidence of prior reports of the abuse to
the police by the woman. Within Extraneous factors, the following were raised most often: the woman’s general reputation; whether the woman was ever violent toward her partner
or anyone else; whether the man was generally violent; whether the woman used alcohol or drugs; the woman’s mental
health; and how the community was reacting to the case.
(See Table 2 for frequencies for individual topics within all
subcategories.)

Methodology III: Comparison of Vignette Ratings of Case
Elements Impacting Likelihood to Prosecute
The three groups of law students reading different versions of
the vignettes were compared on their general tendency toward
prosecution. A one-way ANOVA found no differences in ratings, F(2,61)=2.48, p=n.s.
Three separate MANOVAs were conducted to compare
ratings for all 42 sets of vignettes. Specifically, the ratings of
the 14 sets distributed to the first and second group, the ratings
of the 14 sets distributed to the first and third groups, and the
ratings of the 14 sets distributed to the second and third groups
were the dependent variables for each MANOVA. The overall
MANOVA was significant for all three analyses – Vignette Set
1 (F(14,27)=6.41, p>0.0001); Vignette Set 2 (F(14,27)=
11.46, p> 0.0001); and Vignette Set 3 (F(14,27) = 19.26,
p>0.0001). Subsequent univariate analyses (p<0.05) demonstrated that two-thirds of the vignette pairs (i.e., 28 out of 42
sets) yielded significant differences in ratings of likelihood to
prosecute (i.e., nine vignettes significantly different for
Vignette Set 1; eight vignettes significantly different for
Vignette Set 2; eleven vignettes significantly different for
Vignette Set 3).
Of the 13 vignettes manipulating elements of SD, eight
(62 %) produced significantly different ratings as to the likelihood of prosecution (See Table 3). Participants were more
likely to prosecute if: 1) after a threat to kill, the man fell asleep
and the woman shot him compared with shooting him immediately; 2) the woman did not retreat from the situation because she Bdid not think of it^ vs. due to having small children
in the home; 3) there were no apparent injuries evident on the
woman at the time vs. presence of injuries; 4) the man was
shot four times vs. shot only once; 5) the woman ran out of the
house after the shooting knowing the man was dead so police
would know where to come vs. running out of the house
thinking the man was still alive and in fear of him; 6) the signal
that the man was going to beat her was vague and ambiguous
vs. the signal was obviously threatening; 7) the woman was
vague but claimed the shooting was an accident vs. being
vague but claiming self-defense; and 8) the woman could
not explain clearly to the police what caused her fear vs. the
woman being able to clearly delineate what caused her fear.
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All four of the vignettes representing general guilt/
innocence factors of the cases produced different ratings.
Participants were much more likely to rate vignettes as ones
they would prosecute if: 1) the woman told her attorney that
the written statement that the police had was her own and that
it was accurate vs. the woman reported problems with the
statement and said it was inaccurate; 2) the woman cleaned
up the crime scene before the police came by vs. the crime
scene viewed by the police was as the woman described it; 3)
the woman misperceived a bulge in the man’s pocket as a gun
vs. the woman accurately perceived the bulge as a gun; and 4)
there was an hour delay between the shooting and the woman
calling 911 vs. there was no delay.
Ten of the vignettes manipulated factors regarding the credibility of a history of physical abuse, and six (60 %) of them
were rated differently by participants. Law students were significantly more likely to prosecute if: 1) the woman had no
medical history to corroborate injuries resulting from abuse
vs. a documented medical history of injuries; 2) the deceased
man’s ex-wife reported she had not been physically abused by
him vs. his ex-wife reported similar physical abuse; 3) there
were no calls to police made by the woman regarding prior
incidents of physical abuse by her partner vs. there was a
record of her calling police about his violence; 4) an evaluation of the woman resulted in no diagnosis of PTSD from the
physical abuse vs. the evaluation stated that she did have
PTSD; 5) the woman had used some physical force herself
toward the man vs. there was only unilateral violence by the
man; and 6) the last major physical incident had occurred
3 years ago vs. taking place 2 weeks prior.
Extraneous elements comprised the manipulated factors in
15 vignettes, and 10 (67 %) of them produced significant
differences between the two versions. Prosecution was much
more likely to occur if: 1) the woman had been drinking a
significant amount at the time vs. the woman had not been
drinking at all; 2) the victim was the woman’s husband vs. the
victim was her boyfriend; 3) the man did not have any type of
mental condition vs. the man had a history of mental disorder;
4) the dead man’s family wanted the woman to be prosecuted
for the death vs. the dead man’s family did not want her to be
prosecuted; 5) the woman was significantly overweight vs. the
woman was very small; 6) the woman was not well liked in
the community vs. the woman generally had a good reputation; 7) there was no involvement by any advocacy groups
regarding the woman’s case vs. there was active involvement
by an advocacy group; 8) the man had no reputation for being
generally violent in the community vs. the man had a reputation for violence; 9) the woman was rumored to be having an
affair vs. the woman was thought to be a faithful wife; and 10)
the woman was calm and quiet after the killing vs. the woman
was hysterical.
Of interest are those SD elements that did not demonstrate
significant differences even though they were predicted to

870

influence decisions to prosecute. Specifically, the following
scenario sets did not result in different ratings due to the manipulated variable: whether the woman specifically claimed to
be afraid of the man vs. not stating such when talking with the
police; whether the man was shot in the front vs. the back;
whether the cue that the woman reported made her believe she
was in danger was unique to the incident in which the man
was killed vs. a familiar cue for battering she had experienced
before; whether the woman explained she shot the man repeatedly out of fear vs. the woman having difficulty remembering
why she shot repeatedly; and whether the woman reported
never being able to escape from battering episodes in the past
vs. often being able to escape in the past, but not that night.

Discussion
As predicted, different methods assessing whether particular
case factors would influence decisions to prosecute battered
women’s homicide cases did result in apparent disparities.
When presented with predesignated specific case elements,
participants subjectively and deliberately reported their intention to more likely consider legal (i.e., self-defense and guilt/
innocence elements) over supplemental variables, and especially over extraneous variables. When spontaneously devising their own criteria with no lists or structure to guide them,
participants generated many more supplemental factors to be
considered in battered women’s homicide cases than legal
factors. When responding to hypothesized factors in vignettes
that were expected to influence decisions to prosecute battered
women’s cases, participants very often were inclined to prosecute compared with the control vignettes. What makes these
findings noteworthy is the extensive use of supplemental variables by the participants, especially when they were extraneous to BW’s cases or salient for decision-making when methodologies were more indirect but not considered for decisionmaking when assessed directly, i.e., on a list of potential case
variables. Most of the extraneous variables used or generated
in this project are those that should not be part of a decision to
prosecute, so their emergence when the data were collected
indirectly (i.e., through open-ended responses or through vignette ratings) is somewhat alarming. This study cannot demonstrate how the combination of factors that a person might
consider would result in a final decision, but based on the
potential of many of these variables for tipping the balance
toward prosecution when other aspects of a case might suggest a case should not be prosecuted is of concern.
Because two of the methodologies deliberately included
case elements designed to reflect stereotypical thinking about
battered women, the spontaneously generated case elements
in the third, and least directive, methodology were of special
interest. Would individuals with some legal training who were
told to consider themselves in the role of a prosecutor produce
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responses that were strictly legal in nature and not reminiscent
of myths and stereotypes about battered women? With over
one-fourth of these responses codified as Extraneous variables, even taking into account those comments focused on
the mental health of the man or woman, the range of nonessential, potentially biasing, and even blatantly worrisome
elements that were extemporaneously injected for consideration in a prosecution decision were troublesome.
This research study cannot and does not assert that the
extraneous factors arose from unconscious processes, but rather that their presence is noteworthy for the potential influence
they might have, whether unconscious or not. The research
showing that individuals, upon recognizing that they are relying on stereotypic information, may or may not be able to
control the response that incorporates the stereotype (Banaji
and Hardin 1996), illustrates what may be of more concern for
decisions to prosecute in these cases when the activation of
stereotypes occurs. However, because Devine (1989) demonstrates that the emergence of a stereotype may not always be
linked with prejudice, such that one could know societal stereotypes but not endorse them or accept them, further research
is needed to answer whether knowing stereotypes about BW
actually impacts prosecution decisions or whether they only
influence individuals who believe the stereotypes to be accurate across all BW.
Decision-making when Factors are Specifically Delineated
In line with the expected outcome, participants making judgments about a designated list of specific case elements for BW
cases for consideration when making decisions to prosecute
produced ratings that linearly demonstrated their subjective
and cognizant intent to 1) most definitely utilize legal selfdefense elements, 2) then to rely on legal elements assessing
guilt/innocence, and 3) finally to Bprobably consider^ aspects
of the woman’s history of being battered. Their ratings demonstrated that they would not likely consider extraneous supplemental elements.
It may be encouraging to note that the woman’s history of
battering would at least be given Bprobable^ consideration if it
were known at the time a decision to prosecute was made,
even though a nuanced understanding of her relational history
and her subjective perceptions shaped by that history may
require much more in-depth investigation before a decision
was made. Unfortunately, a woman’s history of battering often
only comes to light through a defense attorney raising this
information and often regrettably after a decision to prosecute
has been made. Even though some might be encouraged to
think that legal decision makers would want to know about
battered women’s unfortunate histories and the impact of that
information on the women’s mental state and behavior, we do
not know if this scrutiny is necessarily an empathic concern.
The significant vignette factors pertaining to a woman’s
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battering history seemed to suggest that unless a battered
woman had good documentation of a) recent and b) severe
mistreatment resulting in c) serious mental consequences
(PTSD), she was going to be prosecuted. And, if she had ever
used physical force to defend herself, she would most definitely be prosecuted. The only exception to the participants’
dismissal of extraneous supplemental elements as factors they
would consider was the woman’s history of mental illness,
which could have relevance for criminal responsibility. For
all other factors in the extraneous category, however, participants were quite consistent in Bnot considering^ all other extraneous case elements.
More Indirect Assessment of Decisions to Prosecute
Which case elements are given priority for consideration shifts
fairly dramatically when decision makers respond to openended inquiry by generating factors they consider important
for decisions to prosecute these cases. The second hypothesis,
that indirect assessment would result in production of supplemental factors in addition to legal factors to consider when
deciding to prosecute or not, was supported by the finding that
two-thirds of participants’ responses were focused on the
credibility of the woman’s battering history and extraneous
case elements. The significance of the proliferation of supplemental elements is that even these relatively sophisticated participants produced issues for prosecution decisions that demonstrate stereotyping, requirements for these women’s defense
that would not be generally compelled for any homicide case,
and factors that absolutely should not be considered for such a
decision. Although it is unknown how much weight a participant would give to extraneous case elements compared with
the rest of his/her generated answers, even lesser considerations or irrelevant or biasing elements could tip the balance
from a decision maker being less willing to prosecute toward a
willingness to prosecute.
The supplemental factors that were spontaneously generated from the open-ended response format resulted in several
prominent themes. The first reflected the participants’ concern
that the woman had stayed in an abusive relationship. To
avoid prosecution, she should have engaged in actions to fix
the relationship or she should have left it; if the options she
tried did not work, she was still a sympathetic figure and less
likely to be prosecuted. If she did not try, especially if she was
perceived as having resources (e.g., a job, being educated,
support from others, her own income), then prosecuting her
was a more likely option. This orientation is perilous for the
woman’s likelihood of ending up in the justice system even if
she acted in self-defense, and it demonstrates misunderstanding of severe battering cases in which women are usually still
present because of the man’s repeated threats to kill her (or
their child or a family member) should she try to leave. Even if
threats were not present, her successful coping while in a very
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difficult relationship would be punished based on the externally imposed value that one is never allowed to remain in a
relationship where physical force exists.
A second theme elicited from the spontaneous comments
was the expectation that the woman must be an upstanding
person in every way to reduce the likelihood of prosecution.
Any deviation rendered her liable for prosecution (e.g., infidelity, not believing in God, using alcohol or drugs, any prior
use of physical force, any prior record, her behavior provoking
violence from her husband, not being from a prominent family, multiple marriages that implied she married men solely for
money or status). What is not considered in this morallyoriented viewpoint that only Bgood^ people are allowed to
defend themselves is the potential impact of the abusive relationship on the woman’s functioning over time. A woman may
have tried to physically defend herself by using physical force
herself. She might have turned to substances to relieve anxiety
resulting from living with the threat of being beaten. Or, she
may actually have problems which have no bearing on whether she needed to defend herself when she killed the man.
The general reputation of the husband in the community
was the third theme. When decision makers suggested that
information about whether the abusing husband was a Bbad
guy^ would be important for their prosecution decision, the
woman was less likely to be prosecuted (e.g., he was a
convicted felon or habitual criminal; he was a wealthy man
taking advantage of a poor woman; the man’s abuse of her
included sexual abuse). However, in what seems like an unfair
assessment, she was more likely to be prosecuted if the man
she killed was a prominent person in the community.
The role of children was an additional theme, but introducing children as a factor in prosecutions decisions could work
either for or against a BW. The woman must not have endangered the children through her self-defensive actions and children must not have been present at the homicide, both elements definitely raising the likelihood of prosecution. But,
any suggestion that her actions were in the defense of the
children (either at the time of the killing or from the man’s
actions toward them in the past) seemed to render her quite
blameless.
Other themes included: 1) If the woman historically had
major life difficulties, irrespective of her relationship with
the man she killed, she was more of a sympathetic character
(i.e., mentally deficient, mentally disordered, abused as a child
or previously as an adult); 2) If the woman discovered her
husband in the act of infidelity, participants were less likely
to prosecute; and 3) the impact of such a case upon the
Bcommunity^ might influence a decision to prosecute, such
as the cost of a trial, a prosecutor’s caseload, or concern about
community backlash. These themes alert us to the potential
problem of the intrusion of unfair or irrelevant variables
impacting decision-making processes that warrant further exploration within the justice system.
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Impact of Manipulated Factors within Vignettes
on Decisions to Prosecute
The best statistical data resulted from comparison of case elements within the vignettes. As predicted, many (67 %) of
both legal and supplemental comparisons demonstrated differences in decision makers’ likelihood to prosecute. Variables
that did not demonstrate statistical differences, especially
some self-defense factors, may have been insignificant due
to an artifact of the way they were written, thus warranting
further investigation.
Most interestingly, a number of vignette comparisons clearly demonstrated that case elements were influential for predictions of prosecution that contradicted the stated intent of participants in the first methodological approach. That is, case
elements which decision makers reported they would not consider when they read that factor on a list of case elements often
demonstrated a significant impact when decision makers
responded to contrasting vignettes representing those factors.
For example, in the first methodology, participants rated
Bpersonal characteristics of the woman,^ Bthe opinion of the
dead man’s family as to whether they wish for the woman to
be prosecuted,^ and Bthe involvement of an advocacy group
in the case^ as factors they would not be likely to consider in
deciding to prosecute. However, in the vignette comparisons,
the woman’s reputation in the community (whether she was
faithful or rumored to be having an affair; whether she was
well liked or not) was highly influential for a decision to
prosecute, as were the dead man’s family’s preference for
her to be prosecuted, and whether an advocacy group was
involved, highlighting a potential discrepancy between intentions and actual impact. Supporting the likelihood of extraneous variables influencing decisions to prosecute is the match
between those factors that did influence decision makers’ likelihood to prosecute with anecdotal literature warning that particular stereotypes or case discrepancies with self-defense
criteria may influence outcomes (e.g., Gillespie 1989) or with
factors previously identified through quasi-experimental research manipulating personal variables of battered women
defendants as problematic variables for these cases (e.g.,
Follingstad et al. 1996). The fact that this study identified
personal aspects of the battered woman (i.e., her size, her
drinking, her reputation), or the preference of the deceased
man’s family, or the woman’s demeanor after the killing as
producing significantly different orientations toward prosecution strongly suggests the need for greater understanding of
these discretionary decisions.
Implications and Recommendations for Future Research
The fact that the participants in this study were college educated and somewhat sophisticated regarding criminal legal
issues due to their presence in a Criminal Law course suggests
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that the results may be highly pertinent to how decisions to
prosecute may currently be made within the criminal justice
system. However, law students have not yet joined the work
force as decision-makers in the legal arena, so their judgments
were made without having had experience with actual battered
women or self-defense cases. Thus, it is important to know
whether legal experience in general, or specific experience
with battered women’s cases in which claims of self-defense
are made, would result in different outcomes than the findings
of this exploratory study. Essentially, the question to be answered would be, BDoes more knowledge and/or experience
provide a greater buffer from considering extraneous supplemental variables?^ A future research study comparing law
students’ typical approach to these cases with that of prosecutors’ approach, however, must not predetermine the potential
direction or valence if differences are identified, as selective
perception may rigidify pre-existing views rather than additional legal experience moving prosecutors toward viewing
cases on individual merits.
As mentioned earlier, prosecutors may not be the only legal
personnel involved in making judgments as to whether
battered women’s homicide cases should be prosecuted.
What is unknown is whether prosecutors, law enforcement
officers, grand jury members, and even judges in particular
communities or states reflect similar views toward battered
women and their legal cases. There has been some sensitization for legal professionals regarding women’s issues (e.g.,
rape cases, battered women), which if they were exposed to
such training, might predict different approaches to battered
women homicide cases from grand jury members and possibly law enforcement officers. Future research needs to employ
the range of these methodologies with these various decisionmakers to determine whether prosecutors, law enforcement
officers, grand jury members, and judges demonstrate similar
patterns to each other for these cases. Such research should
assess whether participants received any training in women’s
issues, whether they specifically received training regarding
battered women, and the amount of training they have accumulated. These data would be necessary to use as covariates in
research assessing decisions to prosecute using the types of
methodologies employed in this study.
Making decisions to prosecute battered women is, admittedly, a complex process. An important step for this research
in the future would entail determining how prosecution decisions are made when multiple factors are salient and which
factors are most predictive of final decisions. Possibly vignette
studies that reflect the complicated scenarios for battered
women’s legal cases that incorporate multiple factors regarding self-defense, guilt/innocence, the woman’s battering history, and extraneous supplemental variables would be useful
for identifying the most predictive factors.
Further research that studies the process of discretionary
decision-making as applied to battered women’s homicide
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cases is likely to raise awareness of the complexity of decisionmaking for these cases and encourage greater accountability for
understanding the influences on these decisions. Certainly, if
training in women’s issues impacts decisions that prosecutors
make regarding battered women’s homicide cases, this finding
would have implications for instituting and evaluating such
training programs. Defense lawyers may need to be cognizant
of research results of this type to pre-empt decision-making that
might arise from stereotypical biases toward battered women.
And, this line of research may also stimulate the investigation
of other decisions to prosecute in the criminal justice system
beyond these specific cases to illuminate and potentially impact
this discretionary process.
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